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INTRODUCTION 
Online retail spending topped $80 billion in 2005.1  Shopping 
on the Internet has become increasingly routine, with an estimated 
$18.6 billion spent online during the first six weeks of the 2005 
holiday season alone.2  The rising popularity of online shopping 
has captured the attention of savvy advertisers, striving to 
capitalize on a virtually limitless mass of consumers.  However, 
advertisers need the assistance of technology to showcase their 
 
 1 Press Release, JupiterResearch, JupiterResearch Forecasts Online Retail Spending 
Will Reach $144 Billion in 2010, a CAGR of 12% from 2005, JUPITERMEDIA.COM, Feb. 6, 
2006, http://www.jupitermedia.com/corporate/releases/06.02.06-newjupresearch.html. 
 2 Diane Anderson, Online Gift Shopping Up 16% This Year, ADWEEK.COM, Dec. 21, 
2005, 
http://www.adweek.com/aw/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1001736210. 
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Internet ads to the relevant customer base.3  For example, if a Web 
user is searching for sneakers, a company such as Nike may want 
to immediately target that specific user with one of its ads, as 
opposed to posting advertisements randomly or in bulk.  
Fortunately, contextual advertising4 systems enable companies to 
do just that: recognize what a Web user is interested in, and deliver 
targeted advertisements based upon that interest. 
Online contextual advertising is possible via the innovations of 
companies like WhenU, Inc.5 and Google, Inc.6  By scanning the 
text of a webpage or the keywords typed into a search engine,7 a 
contextual advertising system can return targeted ads based upon 
such content.8  Therefore, Nike is able to deliver a targeted 
advertisement for, say, a new running shoe to a user viewing the 
Adidas website.  The consumer is now offered a choice between 
competing brands, just as any department store patron would when 
perusing the sportswear section.  However, trademark law is being 
used to prevent the online customer from ever seeing such 
competing advertisements.9  This creates an unsettling paradox 
between what is legal online versus offline, and raises the 
following question: Should the legality of advertising depend upon 
on the underlying medium? 
This note explores the unsettled law surrounding the legality of 
online contextual advertising and illustrates why it is important for 
courts to avoid adapting jurisprudence to the Internet in a way that 
establishes different standards for online and offline advertising.  
Part I discusses contextual advertising and some of the 
technologies that implement such advertising online, Part II 
 
 3 See Note, Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest 
Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387 (2004) (discussing the necessity of 
targeting the appropriate customer base in order to reap the benefits of the online 
audience, and the use of new marketing applications to do so). 
 4 See infra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra Part I.B. 
 6 See infra Part I.A. 
 7 See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 8 Shari Thurow, Contextual Advertising: Facts, Myths, And Misconceptions – Part 1, 
WEBPRONEWS.COM, Feb. 9, 2005, http://www.webpronews.com/ebusiness/ 
ebusinesstactics/wpn-8-20050209ContextualAdvertisingFactsMythsandMisconceptions 
Part1.html. 
 9 See infra Part II.B-C. 
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summarizes the applicable trademark law jurisprudence and how it 
is being used to render online contextual advertising illegal, and 
Part III illustrates why enforcing different standards for online and 
offline advertising is adverse to the goals of trademark law. 
I. CONTEXTUAL ADVERTISING VIA SEARCH ENGINES AND POP-UPS 
When customers shop for a particular item, they rarely enter a 
store with only one brand to choose from.  Alternatives abound, 
with choices between brands conveniently placed nearby for quick 
comparison.  For example, a customer entering a Macy’s 
department store to purchase Nike sneakers may also see Adidas 
and other competitors on the same shelf.  Such commonplace 
examples of fair competition are replicated for the online consumer 
through contextual advertising. 
Contextual advertising refers to ads, displayed to a user 
browsing the Web, that are related to the contents of the current 
webpage.10  Suppose a user is searching for available flights.  
Based on the words or other contents of that page, a program may 
deliver an ad describing another airline’s last minute flight 
discounts.11  Hence, the ad is contextual because it is targeted to 
the subject matter (“context”) of the webpage.12  Contextual 
advertising is commonly implemented via search engines13 or pop-
ups.14 
 
 10 Danny Sullivan, Google Throws Hat into the Contextual Advertising Ring, 
SEARCHENGINEWATCH.COM, Mar. 4, 2003, http://searchenginewatch.com/sereport/ 
article.php/2183531. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
Search engines are websites that allow users to find information on the Internet. Id.  
Google, Inc. operates a popular search engine at http://www.google.com. 
 14 Id. at 476 n.18 (describing Pop-ups as “windows containing notifications or 
advertisements that appear on the screen, usually without any triggering action by the 
computer user”). 
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A. Search Engines and Keyed Banner Advertisements 
With a search engine, a Web user can enter keywords to 
generate a list of related webpages.15  The keywords can be generic 
(e.g. “sneaker”) or a trademark (e.g. “Nike”).16  Because website 
owners have limited control over their placement on a search 
results page,17 search engines operated by Google and Netscape 
Communications Corp. (“Netscape”) have generated significant 
revenue by selling advertisements “keyed” to certain keywords.18  
For example, Adidas may pay Google to have its advertisement 
displayed when a user enters the keyword “Nike.”  The Web user 
is now presented with online sportswear alternatives that are 
comparable to those found in a typical brick-and-mortar19 
department store. 
Keyed advertisements on a search engine results page are 
usually in the form of “banner ads.”20  Banner ads are on the top or 
side of the query results, distinguishing them from the user’s 
ordinary results list.21  The ordinary results, accordingly, may 
include the Nike website and other sites selling Nike apparel, while 
a banner ad for Adidas appears off to the right.  This simulates in-
person shopping because, analogizing the Web to one gigantic 
shopping mall, any consumer searching for a product may be 
 
 15 Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 691 (6th 
Cir. 2003). “[S]earch engines work by comparing search terms entered by the Internet 
user with databases of websites maintained by the search engine, generating a results 
page that lists the websites matching the search term.” Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 16 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
 17 See Interactive Prods. Corp., 326 F.3d at 691–92 (“Each search engine uses its own 
algorithm to search for and arrange web pages in sequence, so the list of web pages . . . 
may differ depending on the search engine used. Search engines usually look for 
keywords in places such as domain names, actual text . . . , and metatags.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 18 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“Keying allows [companies] to target individuals with certain interests by 
linking advertisements to pre-identified terms. . . .  After paying a fee . . . , [companies] 
could have [their] advertisements appear on the page listing the search results. . . .”). 
 19 “Brick-and-mortar” is a term used to distinguish a traditional “street-side” business 
with its online counterpart. See, e.g., INVESTOPEDIA.COM, at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brickandmortar.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
 20 Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1023. 
 21 See id. 
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tempted by competing alternatives despite an initial interest in 
seeking a specific brand. 
B. Contextual Pop-up Advertisements 
Most computer users are probably familiar with the Microsoft 
Windows operating system.  After launching a program such as an 
Internet browser or word processor, a “window” appears that 
encapsulates that program.22  Separate windows can be open at the 
same time, allowing multiple applications to run simultaneously.23  
A pop-up is simply one of these windows and may display an 
advertisement over or underneath other windows.24 
Companies like Claria Corp.25 and WhenU, Inc. develop 
software that implement contextual advertising via pop-ups.26  
Claria “operates a software-based advertising network called the 
[GAIN] Network.”27  Through the GAIN Network, Claria “sees 
consumer behavior in real-time” and delivers “contextually 
relevant” pop-up advertisements.28  Many of these pop-ups are 
advertisements from competitors of the website a user is currently 
viewing.29  For example, the GAIN Network can observe a user 
visiting the Hertz car rental website and immediately deliver a pop-
up ad from another car rental company such as Alamo.30 
 
 22 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. at 478 (describing different ads generated by SaveNow software, including 
pop-ups that are over other windows, and pop-unders which appear behind the webpage 
visited). 
 25 See, e.g., CLARIA.COM, http://www.claria.com/companyinfo (last visited Apr. 10, 
2005). Claria was previously known as Gator. 
 26 See generally Jason A. Cody, Just Whenu Thought It was All Over, Gator’s Kin Pops 
Up and Slides Out of Dangerous IP Waters (for the Most Part): A Review of 2 Online 
Pop-Up Advertisers and 4 Internet Law Decisions, 7 PGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2004) 
(discussing Gator and WhenU’s dominance in the online pop-up advertising industry). 
 27 Hertz Corp. v. The Gator Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (D.N.J. 2003) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
 28 CLARIA.COM, http://www.claria.com/advertise (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
 29 GAINPUBLISHING.COM, http://www.gainpublishing.com/global/about (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005). 
 30 See Hertz Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 423. 
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Similarly, WhenU delivers contextual pop-up advertisements 
through its SaveNow software.31  A computer user with SaveNow 
will receive targeted pop-up ads based on the Web address of the 
current webpage, the overall content of the webpage, or keywords 
typed into a search engine.32  SaveNow chooses which category of 
advertisements to send by comparing the above data with a 
“directory of commonly used search phrases, commonly visited 
Web addresses, and various keyword algorithms”33  Once a user 
receives a pop-up from either Claria or WhenU software, users 
typically must stop their current browsing activity and either click 
on the ad or close its window.34  The analogous in-person shopping 
experience is simply deciding whether or not to visit the 
competitor’s display. 
II. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE LEGALITY OF CONTEXTUAL 
ADVERTISING 
Trademark law has been a weapon of choice for plaintiffs who 
want to prevent a Web user from viewing a competitor’s 
contextual banner or pop-up advertisements.35 
A. Trademark Law Overview 
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” used to indicate the source of a good.36  
Trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act,37 is a subset of unfair 
 
 31 U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 32 WHENU.COM, at http://www.whenu.com/products_savenow_help.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005). 
 33 U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
 34 See Geoffrey D. Wilson, Internet Pop-Up Ads: Your Days are Numbered!: The 
Supreme Court of California Announces a Workable Standard for Trespass to Chattels in 
Electronic Communications, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 567, 570 (2004) (“When a pop-
up ad pops up, users are forced to stop whatever they are doing and close the newly 
created browser window.”). 
 35 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding Netscape’s keyed advertising program may infringe upon Playboy’s 
registered trademarks). 
 36 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005). 
 37 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000). 
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competition law.38  It “secure[s] to the owner of [a] mark the 
goodwill of his business and . . . protect[s] the ability of consumers 
to distinguish among competing producers.”39  In other words, the 
Lanham Act “protect[s] consumers who have formed particular 
associations with a mark from buying a competing product using 
the same or substantially similar mark and to allow the mark 
holder to distinguish his product from that of his rivals.”40  
Therefore, a relatively unknown athletic apparel manufacturer 
cannot boost sales by marking his products with a “Swoosh” 
symbol substantially similar to that associated with Nike.41 
Contextual advertising is commonly attacked on trademark 
infringement and unfair competition grounds.42  Section 32 of the 
Lanham Act governs trademark infringement and proscribes the 
“use in commerce [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion.”43  Unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Act provides 
essentially the same protection to unregistered trademarks that § 32 
 
 38 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003). 
 39 Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (citation omitted). 
 40 Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005). 
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 
reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for 
it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item - the item with 
this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that 
he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a 
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. 
Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (1999) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
 41 See Bosley Med. Inst., 403 F.3d at 679 (“Trademark laws are intended to protect 
consumers from purchasing the products of an infringer [because of] the mistaken 
assumption that they are buying a product produced or sponsored by [the trademark 
holder].”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 42 See, e.g., U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 
2003). The court described the case as involving “pop-up advertising and Plaintiff U-
Haul’s claim that Defendant WhenU’s pop-up advertising  infringes upon U-Haul’s 
trademark . . . and amounts to unfair competition.” Id. at 724. 
 43 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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guarantees registered trademarks.44  Consequently, courts have 
interpreted the above provisions as requiring a plaintiff to prove: 
(1) that it possesses a mark, (2) that the defendant used the 
mark, (3) that the defendant’s use of the mark occurred in 
commerce, (4) that the defendant used the mark in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of goods or services, and (5) that the defendant 
used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers.45 
The “use in commerce” and “likelihood of confusion” 
requirements have proven to be the most controversial in 
trademark cases involving contextual advertising.46 
1. Use in Commerce Requirement 
With respect to goods, a trademark is used in commerce when 
it is “placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed 
thereto.”47  The Lanham Act also specifies that a mark is used in 
commerce in connection with services “when it is ‘used or 
displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are 
rendered in commerce.’”48  This requirement is essential, and the 
Lanham Act clearly stipulates that non-commercial use of a 
trademark is not actionable.49 
2. Likelihood of Confusion and the Initial Interest Confusion 
Doctrine 
Once it can be shown that a defendant used plaintiff’s mark in 
commerce, infringement is only found if such use is likely to 
 
 44 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1046.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
provides a cause of action against a party who “uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause 
confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association [of that party’s] goods, 
services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2000) (emphasis added). 
 45 U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 46 See infra Part II.B-C. 
 47 U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)). 
 48 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). 
 49 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(4)(B) (2000)). 
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confuse “an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent 
purchasers.”50  If the court finds that these purchasers are confused 
regarding the source of the defendant’s goods or services, or 
believe that they are sponsored or endorsed by the plaintiff’s mark, 
the confusion is actionable.51  Courts apply multi-factor tests to 
assess likelihood of confusion.  These factors may include, but are 
not limited to,52 (1) the strength of plaintiff’s mark, (2) similarity 
of the marks, (3) proximity of the products, (4) likelihood the 
plaintiff will “bridge the gap” between the products, (5) existence 
of actual confusion, (6) sophistication of ordinarily prudent 
purchasers, (7) bad faith, and (8) the quality of the defendant’s 
products.53 
Plaintiffs in online contextual advertising cases benefit from a 
doctrine called “initial interest confusion.”54  In some Circuits, 
actionable confusion is not limited to cases where purchasers are 
confused as to source or sponsorship at the point of sale,55 but also 
encompasses trademark use “calculated to capture initial consumer 
attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a 
result of the confusion. . . .”56 
In the landmark initial interest confusion case, Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation, 
Brookfield Communications, Inc. (“Brookfield”) asserted 
trademark infringement and unfair competition against West Coast 
Entertainment Corp. (“West Coast”) for including the 
 
 50 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 51 Id. at 490–91. 
 52 Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (1999) 
(“[T]his eight-factor test for likelihood of confusion is pliant. Some factors are much 
more important than others, and the relative importance of each individual factor will be 
case-specific.”). 
 53 See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 430–34 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (discussing the Polaroid factors). 
 54 See infra Parts II.B.1, II.C.2. 
 55 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 491. But see generally Wells Fargo & Co. v. 
WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (acknowledging that the 6th 
Circuit has not recognized initial interest confusion). 
 56 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
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“MovieBuff” trademark in its website metatags.57  Metatags 
consist of hidden code that describes the contents of a webpage 
and “serve as a cataloging system for a search engine.”58  Because 
search engines use these metatags to generate query results, users 
searching for “MovieBuff” would see both Brookfield’s and West 
Coast’s websites in the query results list.59  To justify a finding of 
infringement against West Coast, the court illustrated initial 
interest confusion with the following analogy: 
Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like 
posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store.  
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts 
up a billboard on a highway reading–”West Coast Video: 2 miles 
ahead at Exit 7”–where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but 
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7.  Customers looking for West 
Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.  
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right 
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.  Even 
consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the 
trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a 
Blockbuster right there.  Customers are not confused in the narrow 
sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from 
Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is 
related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast.  Nevertheless, 
the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter 
the fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast’s 
acquired goodwill.60 
Similarly, the Second Circuit adopted initial interest confusion 
in a case where Pegasus Petroleum Corp. (“Pegasus”) “gain[ed] 
crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal” because third 
parties mistakenly believed Pegasus was related to Mobil Oil 
Corp.61  Plaintiffs alleging trademark infringement rely on this 
argument in many banner and pop-up advertisement cases.62 
 
 57 See id. at 1061–62. 
 58 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 n.3, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 59 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062. 
 60 Id. at 1064. 
 61 Mobile Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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3. The Fair Use Exception 
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of trademark law 
is not to impede fair competition,63 but to ensure that trademark 
owners benefit from the goodwill associated with their marks.64  
Consequently, trademark law seeks to promote fair competition, 
and recognizes legal uses of trademarks in commerce that do not 
misappropriate such goodwill, despite evidence of likelihood of 
confusion.65 
Courts recognize two fair use defenses: “classic” and 
“nominative.”66  Classic fair use applies when “a defendant has 
used a plaintiff’s mark only to describe his own product, and not at 
all to describe plaintiff’s product.”67  In other words, classic fair 
use permits common words to be used in their dictionary sense 
 
Judge MacMahon found a likelihood of confusion not in the fact that a third 
party would do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil, 
but rather in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial 
credibility during the initial phases of a deal. For example, an oil trader might 
listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he 
might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil. 
Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 
(9th Cir. 2004) (asserting users are likely to be initially confused by unlabeled banner 
advertisements that appear after a search for Playboy trademarks); Google Inc. v. 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *7–*8 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (alleging Google’s AdWords advertising program intercepts 
customers by causing them to click on competitor ads because of the false impression 
such ads are associated with American Blind).  Without initial interest confusion, a 
plaintiff is forced to rely solely on point of sale confusion. In other words, a plaintiff must 
prove that an online shopper who clicks on a competitor’s advertisement and is redirected 
to a competing website will never realize the site is independent from the one originally 
sought—even after a purchase is completed. Personal experience dictates the virtual 
impossibility of satisfying such a burden. 
 63 Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword 
Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 571–72 (2002-2003). 
 64 Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 65 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542, 550 
(2004) (holding that evidence of consumer confusion does not necessarily foreclose a fair 
use defense). 
 66 Horphag Research Ltd., 337 F.3d at 1040. 
 67 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 809 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis altered from original) (citation omitted). 
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even if they are also trademarked.68  For example, a farmer using 
the term “Apple” to describe his orchard cannot be held to infringe 
Apple Computer, Inc.’s trademark. 
On the other hand, defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark is 
nominative if the use does describe the plaintiff’s product, but 
“does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to 
appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one.”69  
Nominative fair use “acknowledges that it is often virtually 
impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of 
comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose 
without using [plaintiff’s] mark.”70 
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles, Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. (“PEI”) objected to former Playboy Playmate 
Terri Welles’ use of the title “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981.”  
However, regardless of whether visitors to Terri Welles’ website 
believed that it was sponsored or endorsed by PEI, the nominative 
fair use defense applied: 
There is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe 
herself and her services without venturing into absurd descriptive 
phrases. To describe herself as the “nude model selected by Mr. 
Hefner’s magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the 
year 1981” would be impractical as well as ineffectual in 
identifying Terri Welles to the public.71 
For a defendant to successfully assert a nominative fair use 
defense, (1) “the product or service in question must be one not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark,” (2) “only so 
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary 
to identify the product or service,” and (3) the plaintiff does 
 
 68 Horphag Research Ltd., 337 F.3d at 1041. (“The classic fair use defense ‘applies 
only to marks that possess both a primary and a secondary meaning – and only when the 
mark is used in its primary descriptive sense rather than its secondary trademark sense.’” 
(quoting Brother Records, Inc., v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. “It is well established that the Lanham Act does not prevent one from using a 
competitor’s mark truthfully to identify the competitor’s goods, . . . or in comparative 
advertisements.” Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1065 (1999) (citations omitted). 
 71 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing district 
court’s holding with approval). 
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“nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”72 
B. Contextual Banner Advertisements Under Fire 
As explained previously, search engine providers generate 
revenue by displaying banner advertisements keyed to specific 
terms.73  But, suppose Netscape or Google sells companies the 
right to have their ads keyed to a trademark like “Dell” as opposed 
to a generic keyword such as “laptop.”  Should this constitute 
trademark infringement?  Is this a use in commerce likely to cause 
confusion? 
1. Brookfield Analogy Extended to Keyed Banner 
Advertisements 
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications, PEI 
alleged trademark infringement against Netscape and Excite for 
keying adult-oriented company banner ads to the trademarks 
“playboy” and “playmate.”74  The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, finding 
genuine issues of material fact regarding the trademark 
infringement claims.75 
The Ninth Circuit casually addressed the use in commerce 
requirement in one sentence: “PEI clearly holds the marks in 
question and defendants used the marks in commerce without 
PEI’s permission.”76  Presumably, the court believed the 
defendants committed actionable use in commerce by marketing 
the keyed banner ads to PEI’s competitors, or by including the 
trademarks in the algorithm used to trigger relevant contextual 
banner ads.77 
 
 72 Id. at 802–03. 
 73 See supra Part I.A. 
 74 Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1022–23. 
 75 Id. at 1034.  Playboy also alleged dilution, but the dilution claim is outside the scope 
of this paper. 
 76 Id. at 1024. 
 77 According to the lower court, “Plaintiff has not shown that defendants use the terms 
in their trademark form, i.e., Playboy(R) and Playmate(R), when marketing to advertisers 
or in the algorithm that effectuates the keying of the ads to the keywords. Thus, plaintiff’s 
HANDY 3/17/2006  11:04 AM 
2006] CONFUSION AND COMMERCIAL CHOICE ONLINE 581 
Having found defendants used PEI’s marks in commerce, the 
court addressed the likelihood of confusion prerequisite for 
infringement, focusing on an initial interest confusion theory.  
According to PEI, because the competitor banner advertisements 
appear immediately after users search for the terms “playboy” or 
“playmate,” users will mistakenly believe that the banner ads are 
sponsored by PEI.78  The court likened this case to Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation, 
and found that consumers originally seeking PEI may be lured to 
banner advertisements and simply remain on a competitor’s site 
despite immediately realizing it is wholly unrelated.79  Despite 
formally applying an eight-factor test to determine likelihood of 
initial interest confusion, the issue was essentially decided on one 
factor alone: evidence of actual confusion.80  As the Second Circuit 
recently concluded, 
[t]here can be no more positive or substantial proof of the 
likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion.  
Moreover, reason tells us that while very little proof of 
actual confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood 
of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof 
would be necessary to refute such proof.81 
Therefore, because an expert study established evidence of 
actual confusion, the court noted that this alone justified a reversal 
of the lower court’s grant of summary judgment.82  It is important 
 
argument that defendants ‘use’ plaintiff’s trademarks falls short.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073–74 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit likely adopted the same theory of use, holding that the marks were in 
fact used in their trademark form. 
 78 Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1025. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1026–29. 
 81 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 459 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) 
(quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 
(5th Cir. 1971)). 
 82 Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1026. The court also denied defendant’s fair use 
defenses. The classic fair use defense was disposed of because outdated case law at the 
time supported the court’s assertion that “[a] fair use may not be a confusing use.” As for 
nominative fair use, the court held that defendants failed the first requirement: the 
product or service must not be readily identifiable without the mark. Apparently, the 
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to note that the court expressly limited its decision to unlabeled 
banner advertisements that do not clearly identify their source.83  If 
the banner advertisements were clearly labeled, perhaps by 
expressly discounting affiliation with the entered search terms, the 
majority suggests there may not be a likelihood of confusion.84 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Berzon expressed concern about 
the Brookfield initial interest confusion standard because it 
suggests there could be trademark infringement even if the banner 
advertisements were clearly labeled.85  Brookfield held that “by 
using ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for ‘MovieBuff’ to its 
website, [the defendant] improperly benefits from the goodwill that 
[the plaintiff] developed in its mark.”86  However, if the question is 
simply one of diversion, should Adidas, strategically having a 
sneaker display near rival Nike, be liable to trademark 
infringement as well?  Judge Berzon addressed such a question 
with the following analogy: 
I walk into Macy’s and ask for the Calvin Klein section and am 
directed upstairs to the second floor. Once I get to the second floor, 
on my way to the Calvin Klein section, I notice a more 
prominently displayed line of Charter Club clothes, Macy’s own 
brand, designed to appeal to the same people attracted by the style 
of Calvin Klein’s latest line of clothes. Let’s say I get diverted 
from my goal of reaching the Calvin Klein section, the Charter 
Club stuff looks good enough to me, and I purchase some Charter 
Club shirts instead. Has Charter Club or Macy’s infringed Calvin 
Klein’s trademark, simply by having another product more 
prominently displayed before one reaches the Klein line?  
Certainly not.87 
 
court believed using other words besides Playboy’s marks was a suitable substitute for 
triggering contextual, adult-oriented, banner advertisements. Id. at 1029–30. 
 83 See id. at 1025 n.16 (“Note that if a banner advertisement clearly identified its source 
or, even better, overtly compared PEI products to the sponsor’s own, no confusion would 
occur under PEI’s theory.”). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See generally id. at 1034–36 (Berzon, concurring). 
 86 Id. (Berzon, concurring) (emphasis added). 
 87 Id. at 1035 (Berzon, concurring). 
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Judge Berzon also found that the highway billboard analogy set 
forth in Brookfield88 was inapplicable to the case at hand for two 
reasons: (1) customers searching for PEI’s site were not explicitly 
misdirected because they never actually saw the mark, and (2) the 
trivial inconvenience of clicking the Web browser’s back button to 
return to the search engine results pales in comparison to a driver 
taking the wrong highway exit.89 
2. Whom Does the Use In Commerce Confuse? 
Google, Inc. has faced numerous lawsuits because of its keyed 
banner advertising program, Adwords.90  In Government 
Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc., Google moved to 
dismiss Government Employees Insurance Company’s 
(“GEICO’s”) allegation that Google’s use of the registered marks 
“GEICO” and “GEICO DIRECT” to trigger contextual banner 
advertisements constituted infringement.91  The motion was 
denied, principally because Google was held to commit actionable 
use in commerce of GEICO’s trademarks.92 
With respect to services, a trademark is used in commerce 
“when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of 
services.”93  The court held that Google used GEICO’s marks in 
commerce by “allowing advertisers to bid on the trademarks and 
pay [Google] to be linked to the trademarks.”94  This reasoning 
may satisfy the Lanham Act definition, but it suggested a puzzling 
likelihood of confusion argument. 
Presumably, because the court found trademark use in 
commerce between Google and GEICO’s competitors, the 
“ordinarily prudent purchaser” against whom likelihood of 
confusion is assessed was not the Web user using the Google’s 
 
 88 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 89 Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1036 (Berzon, concurring). 
 90 See generally Google’s Ad Words Under Attack—Overview Over the Pending 
Lawsuit,  http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-pendinglawsuits.htm (last visited Oct. 
31, 2005) (providing a comprehensive overview of the development of domestic and 
foreign lawsuits against Google). 
 91 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 92 Id. at 704. 
 93 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 94 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
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search engine, but rather the GEICO competitors who purchased 
the right to have their ads keyed to GEICO’s marks.  Specifically, 
the court held that “[Google’s] offer of [GEICO’s] trademarks for 
use in advertising could falsely identify a business relationship or 
licensing agreement between [Google] and [GEICO].”95  Common 
sense may dictate that such confusion would never arise because it 
is difficult to comprehend why GEICO would ever encourage 
competition against itself.  The court skirts the issue by simply 
stating that likelihood of confusion is fact-specific and not properly 
resolved through a motion to dismiss. 
After GEICO subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of 
law, the court’s analysis demonstrated that likelihood of confusion 
may be evaluated from the perspective of anyone using Google’s 
search engine, not just the parties who were the targets of the 
trademark use in commerce.96  The court evaluated survey 
evidence that measured whether potential GEICO customers who 
searched for “GEICO” using Google’s search engine mistakenly 
believed that the keyed banner ads were linked to or affiliated with 
GEICO’s website.97  Google prevailed only because of the court’s 
doubts about the reliability of GEICO’s survey methodology.98 
What is striking is that the answer to the question “Whom does 
the use in commerce confuse?” is anyone.  Once the court found 
trademark use in commerce by virtue of Google’s sale of GEICO’s 
trademarks to trigger competitor advertisements, the likelihood of 
confusion analysis was completely unrelated to that transaction.  
Instead, the focus was on the everyday consumer searching for 
insurance, not the competitors who “could falsely identify a 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at 
*17–*20 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (describing GEICO’s survey evidence which evaluated 
the likelihood of confusion of ordinary Web users searching for “GEICO” on Google’s 
search engine). 
 97 Id. at *19–*20. 
 98 Id. at *20–*25. Although not pertinent to this paper, GEICO’s survey evidence was 
sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion for those Google banner ads that included 
the trademark “GEICO” in its text or heading. Id. at *26. 
HANDY 3/17/2006  11:04 AM 
2006] CONFUSION AND COMMERCIAL CHOICE ONLINE 585 
business relationship or licensing agreement between [Google] and 
[GEICO].”99 
C. WhenU Temporarily Banned in New York, Always Popping in 
Virginia and Michigan 
Pop-up and banner advertisements use keywords, including 
trademarks, to trigger a contextual advertisement.  The only 
significant difference is that the former is displayed alongside 
search engine query results, and the latter in a separate window.100  
However, while the use in commerce requirement was not 
carefully scrutinized in the banner ad cases, two district courts 
found that WhenU’s pop-up technology did not involve actionable 
use in commerce.101 
1. U-Haul and Wells Fargo Fail to Demonstrate Use in 
Commerce 
In U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., U-Haul 
alleged WhenU’s use of U-Haul’s uniform resource locator 
(“URL”)102 and trademark “U-Haul” in the SaveNow program 
constituted trademark infringement.103  U-Haul argued that the 
SaveNow software used U-Haul trademarks in commerce by (1) 
displaying pop-up ads on the same computer screen as U-Haul’s 
 
 99 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. This is also consistent with the analysis in 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications where use in commerce was 
found because Netscape sold banner ads keyed to Playboy’s trademarks, see supra note 
77 and accompanying text, and the likelihood of confusion analysis focused on 
consumers searching for Playboy who were not aware of the trademark use in commerce. 
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 100 See supra Part I.A–B. 
 101 See generally U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 
2003)  “[T]he appearance of WhenU’s ads on a user’s computer screen at the same time 
as the U-Haul web page is a result of how applications operate in the Windows 
environment and does not consist ‘use’ pursuant to the Lanham Act.”  Id. at 728; Wells 
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) “WhenU does 
not use any of plaintiffs’ trademarks to identify goods or services, to indicate any 
sponsorship or affiliation with the goods or services advertised by WhenU, or to identify 
the source or origin of any goods or services advertised by WhenU.”  Id. at 747. 
 102 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740–41 (E.D. Mich. 
2003).  A webpage is identified by a unique URL, which usually incorporates the name 
or trademark of the website owner. 
 103 U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 724. 
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website and logo, and (2) incorporating U-Haul’s URL and 
trademark in the SaveNow program.104 
In response to plaintiff’s first use in commerce argument, the 
court noted that WhenU pop-ups open in a “WhenU-branded 
window” that is “separate and distinct” from the U-Haul website 
window.105  A pop-up advertisement does not incorporate the 
entire screen as a “single visual presentation” simply because the 
pop-up advertisement and U-Haul website windows are 
simultaneously visible.106  The court distinguished “framing,” 
which occurs when a single window displays the contents of 
multiple, distinct webpages,107 as being inapposite.108 
Furthermore, the court emphasized that trademark use is not 
established merely because marks are simultaneously visible.109  
The court considered WhenU’s contextual pop-up advertisements 
as being tantamount to comparative advertising,110 which 
nominative fair use clearly permits.111 
The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that WhenU’s 
inclusion of the U-Haul trademark and URL in the SaveNow 
directory constituted actionable use in commerce.112  Unlike 
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc., any use in 
commerce resulting from the sale of contextual ads to plaintiff’s 
competitors was not considered.  Instead, the court focused on the 
computer user who simultaneously views both the U-Haul website 
and the pop-up ad.  Because “U-Haul fails to adduce any evidence 
that WhenU uses U-Haul’s trademarks to identify the source of its 
goods or services,” the court held that there is no use in commerce 
as defined by the Lanham Act.113  Rather, WhenU “merely uses the 
 
 104 Id. at 727.  Defendant also argued the pop-up ads interfered with the use of U-Haul’s 
Web page and, therefore, constituted use in commerce. Id. at 728.  For purposes of this 
paper, this argument need not be addressed. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 727–28. 
 107 Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 748. 
 108 U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727. 
 109 Id. at 728. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 112 U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 728. 
 113 Id. 
HANDY 3/17/2006  11:04 AM 
2006] CONFUSION AND COMMERCIAL CHOICE ONLINE 587 
marks for the ‘pure machine linking function’ and in no way 
advertises or promotes U-Haul’s Web address or any other U-Haul 
trademark.”114 
Because U-Haul was unable to show that WhenU used its 
marks in commerce, it would have been superfluous to address any 
likelihood of confusion arguments.  However, after disposing of 
the use in commerce argument in similar fashion,115 the court in 
Wells Fargo & Co. noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
likelihood of confusion.116  Because the Sixth Circuit does not 
recognize the initial interest confusion doctrine, plaintiffs’ only 
recourse was to prove point of sale confusion.117  In other words, 
plaintiffs had to prove that users clicking an Adidas pop-up ad and 
purchasing sneakers at the Adidas website believed that the 
sneakers were endorsed or sponsored by the Nike website they 
were originally viewing.  Given the implausible prospect of this 
scenario, it is not surprising that the court found plaintiffs’ 
evidence unpersuasive.118 
2. Southern District of New York Finds Hidden Use in 
Commerce 
After two successive court victories, WhenU’s luck seemed to 
run out in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com.119  Judge Batts 
granted 1-800 Contacts’ motion for a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin WhenU from using “1800contacts.com” to trigger 
 
 114 Id. (emphasis added). 
 115 The court in Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc. emphasized that “[t]he 
inclusion of web addresses in WhenU’s proprietary [d]irectory is done to identify the 
category the participating consumer is interested in, such as mortgages, and it dispatch a 
contextually relevant advertisement to that consumer.” 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003)(emphasis added). 
 116 Id. at 764 (“Although the Court’s holding that [WhenU] has not impermissibly used 
plaintiffs’ marks makes it unnecessary to reach the issue of confusion, plaintiffs’ failure 
to establish this element of their claim further weakens their request for injunctive 
relief.”). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id. at 765. 
 119 See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (granting 1-800 Contacts’ motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin WhenU 
from delivering competitive pop-up ads). 
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contextual pop-up advertisements.120  The court found that WhenU 
used 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks in commerce, and such use was 
likely to cause initial interest confusion.121 
According to Judge Batts, 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks were 
used in commerce in two ways.  “First, [by] causing pop-up 
advertisements for  [] Vision Direct to appear when SaveNow 
users have specifically attempted to access Plaintiff’s website – on 
which Plaintiff’s trademark appears[,] Defendants are displaying 
Plaintiff’s mark ‘in the . . . advertising of’ . . . Vision Direct’s 
services.”122  This is in stark contrast to the reasoning in U-Haul 
International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. where the court held that 
trademark use is not established simply because marks are 
simultaneously visible, and a pop-up advertisement does not 
incorporate the entire computer screen as a “single visual 
presentation.”123  Essentially, Judge Batts held that the defendants 
used plaintiff’s mark because the pop-up advertisement was visible 
alongside plaintiff’s trademark on the 1-800 Contacts website. 
Second, the court held that WhenU used plaintiff’s mark to 
advertise and publicize plaintiff’s competitors by including 
“1800contacts.com” in SaveNow’s directory of terms.124  
Therefore, a “pure machine linking function” in the previous 
WhenU cases was unexpectedly actionable use in commerce 
according to Judge Batts in the Southern District of New York.125  
This finding implies that the court believes an ordinarily prudent 
purchaser is likely to be confused by trademark use in commerce 
 
 120 Id. at 510. 
 121 Id. at 508. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Second Circuit recognizes initial interest 
confusion. See Mobile Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 
1987) (“Likelihood of confusion [is found] not in the fact that a third party would do 
business with [defendant] believing it related to [plaintiff], but rather in the likelihood 
that [defendant] would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.”). 
 122 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489 (emphasis added). 
 123 See infra notes 101–07 and accompanying text. The court explicitly stated that it 
disagrees with the Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc. and U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. 
When.com, Inc. cases and is not bound by them. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 
490 n.43. 
 124 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
 125 See supra Part II.C.1 
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even though he or she is not cognizant of its use.126  In fact, Judge 
Batts states unequivocally that actionable use in commerce does 
not require that the trademark identify the source of a good or 
service.127 
After finding use in commerce, Judge Batts found that initial 
interest confusion occurs when potential 1-800 Contacts customers 
are “diverted and distracted” to Vision Direct’s website.128  The 
court held that by triggering pop-ups at the same time a user visits 
the 1-800 Contacts website, Vision Direct misappropriates 1-800 
Contacts’ goodwill by gaining “crucial credibility during the initial 
phases of the deal.”129  To assess the likelihood of initial interest 
confusion, the court examined the same multi-factor test it uses for 
point of sale confusion: the Polaroid factors.130 
The court analyzed some Polaroid factors that are of 
questionable probative value for assessing likelihood of initial 
interest confusion with respect to pop-ups.  For example, the court 
held that the “strength of the plaintiff’s mark,” favors 1-800 
Contacts because its trademark is “suggestive” and, therefore, 
inherently distinctive.131  However, given that (1) users explicitly 
 
 126 The court goes on to belittle the notion that trademark use in commerce must be 
visible: “[WhenU] is doing far more than merely ‘displaying’ Plaintiff’s mark. WhenU’s 
advertisements are delivered to a SaveNow user when the user directly accesses 
Plaintiff’s website . . . allowing Defendant . . . to profit from the goodwill and reputation 
in Plaintiff’s website that led the user to access Plaintiff’s website in the first place.” 1-
800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 490. This is also consistent with the analysis in 
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc. and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Netscape Communications where each court found actionable trademark use in 
commerce involving plaintiff’s competitors, but analyzed likelihood of confusion with 
respect to potential customers who were never privy to the trademark use in question. See 
supra Part II.B.2, notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 127 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489. 
 128 See id. at 493 (“[O]n the Internet, initial interest confusion occurs when ‘potential 
consumers of one website will be diverted and distracted to a competing website.’”). 
 129 Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 
1987)). 
 130 See id. at 494 (applying the traditional eight-factor test to determine likelihood of 
confusion as set forth by Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp. to 
assess the newer doctrine of initial interest confusion). 
 131 Id. at 496.  The “strength of plaintiff’s mark” factor focuses on the mark’s tendency 
to identify goods as originating from a specific source. Id. at 495.  Courts evaluate both 
the mark’s inherent distinctiveness and its distinctiveness in the marketplace. Id. at 496–
97. Ordered from least inherently distinctive to most inherently distinctive, courts use 
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enter the URL for the 1-800 Contacts website into their browser 
before seeing the Vision Direct pop-up, (2) the Vision Direct pop-
up does not incorporate any of 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks, and (3) 
the only issue is whether users believe the pop-up is endorsed or 
sponsored by the website triggering the pop-up, the strength of 
plaintiff’s mark is irrelevant.  Plaintiff’s case depends upon the 
timing of the pop-up, not its actual contents.132  Hence, the mark’s 
distinctiveness, inherent or acquired in the marketplace, does 
nothing to buttress plaintiff’s argument. 
Another Polaroid factor of minimal probative value is the 
“similarity of the marks.”133Here, the court compares the keyword 
“www.1800Contacts.com” located in SaveNow’s hidden directory 
with plaintiff’s trademark “1-800 CONTACTS.”  According to 
Judge Batts, “If Defendants used a mark less similar to Plaintiff’s 
mark—for example, ‘www.contacts.com’—then a SaveNow user 
who received Defendants’ pop-up advertisements after typing into 
a browser ‘www.contacts.com’ would be less likely to associate 
Plaintiff’s mark with Defendants’ pop-up advertisements.”  If 
SaveNow used a different Web address in its directory of terms, no 
pop-ups would appear when a user visited 1-800 Contacts’ 
website.  The court’s reasoning appears to simply reiterate how the 
SaveNow program triggers contextual ads. 
 
four categories to describe a mark: (1) “generic”—common description of goods that 
does not qualify for trademark protection, (2) “descriptive”—describes a products 
features and only is afforded trademark protection if it acquires secondary meaning, (3) 
“suggestive”—only suggests the features of a product so that consumers must use their 
imagination to determine the nature of the goods, and (4) “fanciful or arbitrary”—
completely invented word that receives the highest level of trademark protection. Id. at 
495. 
 132 Cf. id. at 489 (“[B]y causing pop-up advertisements to appear when SaveNow users 
have specifically attempted to find or access Plaintiff’s website, Defendants are ‘using’ 
Plaintiff’s marks that appear on Plaintiff’s website.”). 
 133 Polaroid, 287 2d at 495.  Judge Batts acknowledged that this factor traditionally 
contemplates the consumer actually seeing the trademarks. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 
2d at 496 n.53.  However, applying Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West coast 
Entertainment Corp., the court holds that “the issue is not whether the WhenU or Vision 
Direct marks themselves are similar to the Plaintiff’s marks, but whether the marks used 
by the Defendants (whether actually seen by the consumer or not) are so similar to 
Plaintiff’s mark that [the] similarity could ultimately cause consumer confusion.” Id. at 
496 n.53. 
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Some of the other factors that the court examines are more 
probative.  For example, “proximity of the parties’ services” is 
clearly probative and weighs in favor of the plaintiff.  Because 
both plaintiff and defendant sell replacement contact lenses to 
consumers, a consumer is more likely to erroneously believe 
Visual Direct’s pop-up advertisements are generated by 1-800 
Contacts.  Also, “existence of actual confusion between the marks” 
would obviously be probative because there is no better way to 
prove the likelihood of confusion than with evidence that it really 
occurs.134 
Before ultimately concluding that the Polaroid factors 
demonstrate a likelihood of initial interest confusion, the court 
dismissed WhenU’s branding argument.135  WhenU’s pop-up 
windows had a green “$” mark and the text “SaveNow” across the 
top.136  Also, a “?” symbol in the upper right-hand corner opened 
another window explaining what SaveNow software was, and the 
bottom right read “A WhenU offer—click ? for info.”137  WhenU 
argued that such clearly labeled pop-up ads should not confuse 
consumers.  Judge Batts, despite acknowledging that disclaimers 
can substantially avoid the risk of consumer confusion, discounted 
WhenU’s disclaimers as being completely ineffectual.138  In fact, 
Judge Batts suggested that disclaimers are per se ineffective at 
mitigating initial interest confusion: “Even if Defendants had 
offered evidence of the effect of its branding and disclaimers, such 
evidence would do little to counter Plaintiff’s showing of the 
likelihood of initial interest confusion.”139  Such reasoning could 
effectually force contextual pop-up ad companies like WhenU and 
Claria out of business.  This opinion arguably reflects the adoption 
of a creative, albeit deviant, interpretation of the Lanham Act to 
 
 134 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 135 See 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 504. 
 136 Id. at 503. 
 137 Id.  The court disregards additional WhenU branding implemented subsequent to the 
filing of 1-800 Contact’s lawsuit. Id. at 478 n.23. 
 138 Id. at 504 (“[C]onsumer confusion caused by the pop-up advertisements can hardly 
be alleviated by WhenU’s use of disclaimers with terms that are buried in other web 
pages, requiring viewers to scroll down or click on a link.”). 
 139 Id. 
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advance the policy that pop-up ads are annoying and should be 
illegal.140 
3. Second Circuit Plays Dumb—Cannot Find Trademarks 
The Second Circuit reversed the Southern District, dismissing 
1-800 Contacts’ trademark infringement claims.141  Unfortunately, 
the court balked at an opportunity to specifically address Judge 
Batts’ assertion that actionable trademark use does not require a 
source-identifying component, and instead chose to dismiss the 
issue by holding no trademarks were used, commercial or 
otherwise, by WhenU.142  According to the Second Circuit, 
WhenU’s SaveNow directory does not use 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademarks, but rather only uses the company’s website address.143  
The addition of the “www” and “.com” to 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademark “transform[s] 1-800’s trademark—which is entitled to 
protection under the Lanham Act—to a word combination that 
functions more or less like a public key to 1-800’s website.”144  
The Second Circuit even suggested that the similarity between 1-
800 Contacts’ trademark and its website address was mere 
“happenstance,”145 as if companies fail to recognize that Web users 
“often assume, as a rule of thumb, that the domain name of a 
particular company will be the company name followed by 
‘.com’”146.  Such reasoning clashes with a long line of cases that 
 
 140 See, e.g., Geoffrey D. Wilson, Internet Pop-Up Ads: Your Days are Numbered!: The 
Supreme Court of California Announces a Workable Standard for Trespass to Chattels in 
Electronic Communications, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 567, 571–72 (2004) (providing a 
list of online articles that illustrate the public’s disdain for pop-ups). 
 141 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 440 F.3d 400, 413 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 142 See Id. at 409 (emphasizing the difference between using 1-800 Contacts’ Web site 
address in WhenU’s directory and using the 1-800 Contacts’ trademark itself). 
 143 Id. at 408–09. 
 144 Id. The Second Circuit also explicitly limited the scope of its decision, holding that 
“in order for WhenU to capitalize on the fame and recognition of 1-800’s trademark . . . it 
would have needed to put the actual trademark on the list.” Id. 
 145 Id. at 410. 
 146 Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (1999) 
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recognize the source identification function of domain names 
incorporating trademarks.147 
The Second Circuit also reversed the Southern District’s 
finding that WhenU used 1-800 Contacts’ trademark by virtue of 
its contemporaneous placement with the 1-800 Contacts website.148  
Again, the Second Circuit’s reversal is contingent upon its 
reasoning that WhenU’s pop-ups are triggered by 1-800 Contacts’ 
website address, not its trademark.149  According to the court, “the 
contemporaneous display of the [pop-up and 1-800 Contacts’ 
website] is the result of the happenstance that 1-800 chose to use a 
mark similar to its trademark as the address to its web page.” 
Such a questionable distinction between a trademark and a 
domain name that incorporates the trademark highlights the fact 
that the Second Circuit painstakingly tried to limit its holding to 
the pop-up cases without interfering with those addressing banner 
ads.150  In doing so, the holding focuses more on the specific 
technology of pop-ups rather than the discordant use in commerce 
interpretations in the district court cases reviewed above.151  
Therefore, the Southern District’s general analysis can continue to 
be endorsed by other courts addressing the legality of contextual 
banner ads.152 
 
 147 See, e.g., Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 
2003) (citing a series of cases that recognize that domain names can identify the source or 
sponsorship of a website and are worthy of Lanham Act protection) 
 148 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 410. 
 149 Id. 
 150 The Second Circuit unequivocally stated that its opinion does not address whether or 
not the inclusion of the actual 1-800 Contacts trademark in the SaveNow directory would 
constitute an infringing trademark use. Id. at 409 n.11. 
 151 See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2. 
 152 See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (finding Judge Batts’ decision in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com “better 
reasoned” than the U-Haul and Wells Fargo cases); see also Google Inc. v. American 
Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) 
(denying Google’s motion to dismiss trademark infringement claims because its Adwords 
program does not use American Blind’s trademarks in commerce, noting its approach is 
consistent with that taken by the Eastern District of Virginia in Government Employees 
Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc.). 
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III. WHY THE INITIALLY CONFUSED SHOULD GET A CLUE 
The Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide 
human communication.  The parties and the Court are conversant 
with the workings of the Internet, as well as with the constantly 
expanding body of law that seeks to craft a legal contour for it.  
The Court is mindful of the difficulty of applying well-established 
doctrines to what can only be described as an amorphous situs of 
information, anonymous messenger of communication, and 
seemingly endless stream of commerce.  Indeed, the very vastness, 
and manipulability, of the Internet forms the mainspring of 
plaintiff’s lawsuit.153 
The above cases illustrate the judiciary’s attempt to reconcile 
the new technology of the Internet with longstanding legal 
doctrines.  However, if what is legal in brick-and-mortar is made 
illegal online, perhaps courts have inadvertently changed, rather 
than adapted, jurisprudence in response to new technologies. 
 
A. The Danger of Liberal Findings of Trademark Use in 
Commerce 
The Lanham Act clearly states that liability results from the 
“use in commerce” of a mark that “is likely to cause confusion.”154  
The first two WhenU cases discussed interpreted use in commerce 
as requiring trademark use that identifies the source of goods or 
services.  If the ordinarily prudent purchaser, as a result of such 
source identifying use, is likely to be confused regarding the true 
origin of the good or service, trademark infringement is found, 
barring a proper fair use defense.155  Judge Batts in 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com disagreed, finding actionable use in 
commerce that not only lacked a source identifying function, but 
was not even cognizable to the ordinarily prudent purchaser.156 
 
 153 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073–74 
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 154 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
 155 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 156 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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Recall Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Playboy Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Netscape Communications where she analogized Netscape’s 
banner advertisements to a Macy’s department store customer 
faced with choices between competing brands.157  If it could be 
shown that Charter Club selected its display location by noting 
where the Calvin Klein display was, in other words by “using” the 
Calvin Klein trademark to position itself nearby, would that 
constitute actionable use in commerce?158  Charter Club does not 
feature the Calvin Klein logo on any of its clothing or displays.  
But, use in commerce may be found by virtue of its strategic 
placement near Calvin Klein, and consumers see both brands 
simultaneously.159  Now, the only prerequisite left for infringement 
is proving likelihood of confusion, and only a minimal amount of 
evidence demonstrating actual confusion is required to do so.160  
Therefore, should trademark law ever require Charter Club to 
select floor space based only on the generic department (e.g. men’s 
clothing), and remain completely ignorant of the precise locales of 
specific brands?  Certainly not. 
The above scenario illustrates how irrationally a liberal use in 
commerce doctrine transcribes to the brick-and-mortar world and 
why non-source identifying use in commerce is unique to the 
Internet.  From a policy standpoint, having different standards for 
what constitutes use in commerce online versus offline does not 
promote the fundamental goals of the Lanham Act because it does 
nothing to “protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among 
competing producers.”161  In fact, this harms rather than protects 
consumers because it deprives them of the right to see competing 
producers at all. 
 
 157 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 158 C.f. supra Part II.C.2 (finding trademark use because Vision Direct used 1-800 
Contacts’ trademark to launch its advertisement alongside the 1-800 Contacts webpage). 
 159 C.f. supra note 122 and accompanying text (finding trademark use because Vision 
Direct’s advertisement appears alongside the 1-800 Contacts website “on which [its] 
trademark appears”). 
 160 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Just as search engine users may not 
understand the difference between normal query results and paid advertising and assume 
one is sponsored or endorsed by the other, see infra note 145, Macy’s customers might 
mistakenly believe that Charter Club is another brand name distributed under Calvin 
Klein’s parent company, Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation. 
 161 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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If use in commerce does not even have to identify or 
distinguish products or services, then such use can be found in 
virtually every software program that maps brands to product 
categories.  Any court with the patience to read source-code can 
find use in commerce, effectively eliminating it as a prerequisite 
for infringement.  Under such a scenario, the initially confused 
really must get a clue because their ignorance can single-handedly 
determine whether a defendant is liable for trademark infringement 
or unfair competition.162 
B. What About Fair Use? 
Trademark use that is embedded within a program to trigger 
contextual advertisements does not satisfy the requirements of 
either classic or nominative fair use.163  Such use does not qualify 
as classic fair use because the trademarks are used within hidden 
software code to map brands to general product or service 
categories, not to describe the overall software itself,164  It also 
fails the first prong of the nominative fair use test which requires 
that the product or service not be readily identifiable without the 
trademark.165  For example, Google does not need to refer to every 
trademark used within Adword’s code to describe its function or 
purpose—the contextual advertising service and the technical 
underpinnings behind it are completely distinct. 
These fair use exceptions clearly were not established with 
non-source identifying trademark use in mind, and will not provide 
a defense against the initially confused.  This is not surprising 
because what constitutes trademark use in commerce online has 
been broadened from  the doctrine’s offline counterpart.  As the 
 
 162 A recent survey suggests that Web users are still not particularly adept at 
distinguishing unbiased search results and paid advertising.  See WIRED.COM, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,66374,00.html (Jan. 23, 2005) (“[O]nly 38 
percent of web searchers even know of the distinction [between unbiased and paid 
advertising], and of those, not even half —47 percent—say they can always tell which are 
paid. That comes out to only 18 percent of all web searchers knowing when a link is 
paid.”). 
 163 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 164 Classic fair use is trademark use that only describes the good or service of the party 
accused of infringement. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 165 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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Charter Club and Calvin Klein hypothetical demonstrates, non-
source identifying use in commerce is nonsensical in the brick-
and-mortar world.166  Therefore, any fair use exceptions to non-
source identifying use will be inapposite because such use should 
not be considered actionable in the first place. 
C. How Much Goodwill Does it Take to Click an Ad? 
The Brookfield analogy has been heavily criticized as being 
inapplicable to the realities of the Internet.  According to the court 
in Bihari v. Gross, 
The harm caused by a misleading billboard on the highway is 
difficult to correct. In contrast, on the information superhighway, 
resuming one’s search for the correct website is relatively simple. 
With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can 
return to the search engine’s results and resume searching for the 
original website.167 
Supporters of the billboard analogy may argue that liability 
under the Lanham Act should not be contingent on how convenient 
it is for a consumer to resume his or her initial search.  The 
misappropriation of goodwill should not be excused online, but 
punished elsewhere.  However, the difference in the relative 
hardship between driving back onto the highway versus clicking 
the browser back button is relevant.  Because clicking back and 
forth between links, webpages, and other browser windows is so 
effortless, the decision to click a pop-up or banner advertisement 
does not usually give rise to the same level of conscious decision-
making that exiting a highway does.  Clicking on a hyperlink takes 
about as much exertion as changing the television station with a 
remote control.  Conversely, most individuals do not casually exit 
a highway without good reason. 
Therefore, affording a competitor with “crucial credibility 
during the initial phases of the deal,” may not depend upon the 
misappropriation of anything besides screen space.168  If courts 
continue to insist that use in commerce does not have to be either 
 
 166 See supra Part II.A. 
 167 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 168 See supra  note 61. 
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source-identifying169 or cognizable to the ordinarily prudent 
purchaser,170 the initial interest confusion inquiry should at least 
acknowledge the realities of Web browsing habits and assess 
whether it is misappropriated goodwill or merely halfhearted 
clicking that diverts potential customers.  Trademark law should 
only be interested in policing the former. 
D. Why the Metatag Cases Properly Adapt the Lanham Act to the 
Internet 
It is worth noting that the metatag cases are distinguishable 
from the banner ad and pop-up cases because of what metatags are: 
code describing the contents of a webpage that “serve[s] as a 
cataloging system for a search engine.”171  Therefore, using a 
competitor’s trademark in a metatag is the online equivalent of an 
independent video rental store posting a “Blockbuster” sign in its 
window.172  Because this is actionable in the brick-and-mortar 
world, it should be actionable online.173 
Consider the Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. 
case where Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. (“RMD”) copied 
Niton’s metatags verbatim.174  As a result, entering the phrase 
“home page of Niton Corporation” on a search engine generated a 
query results list that included more of RMD’s websites than 
Niton’s.175  The trademark use in commerce by RMD was not a 
“pure machine linking function,” but did “identify or distinguish 
products or services” because this is precisely what metatags do.  
Therefore, this was a proper adaptation of the Lanham Act to 
metatags; what is illegal offline was held illegal online. 
 
 169 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 170 See supra Part II.B.2, note 126. 
 171 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 172 Furthermore, although the trademarks within the metatags are facially hidden like 
those in the banner ad and pop-up cases, the use of the trademarks is targeted to and 
recognized by the Web user: each website in the query results list claims to be 
categorically similar to the user’s trademark search term which is prominently displayed 
at the top of the list. 
 173 Of course, this is actionable only upon a showing of likelihood of confusion. 
 174 See, 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 175 Id. at 104. 
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CONCLUSION 
As technology continues to replicate in-person shopping 
experiences online, courts should similarly replicate in-person 
jurisprudence online.  When the legality of trademark use differs 
depending upon the underlying technology, courts should query 
whether such a result is consistent with the goals of the Lanham 
Act. 
If courts find actionable trademark use online that is hidden or 
lacks a source-identifying function, likelihood of confusion can be 
the result of anything, including unfamiliarity with new 
technologies.  For example, many consumers cannot discern the 
difference between paid search engine advertising and unbiased 
search results.176  However, consumer confusion regarding how 
search engines generate and display results should not be 
actionable under the Lanham Act.  Unless consumers familiarize 
themselves with the underlying technology, they can be genuinely 
confused, and as a result, companies like Google will be held to 
infringe and competition will be stifled. 
Therefore, by adapting the “use in commerce” prerequisite to 
the Internet in such a way that it is essentially superfluous, the 
ordinarily prudent purchasers take center stage and their initial 
confusion can decide cases.  This is a reckless departure from well-
established jurisprudence that could devastate online contextual 
advertising and deprive the Web user of brand alternatives.  Until 
the Supreme Court precludes courts from finding actionable 
trademark use that is hidden or has no source-identifying function 
whatsoever, consumer confusion resulting from anything except 
cognizable trademark use will shut down these ads and the 
revenue-generating software programs behind them. 
 
 
 176 See supra note 162. 
